

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS: A U.S. STRATEGIC FOOTHOLD OR ACHILLES HEEL IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

by

LTC (P) RICHARD C.CROTTY
UNITED STATES ARMY

Colonel James R. Pullen
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No.
0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

| | | | | |
|---|----------------|---|---------------------------------|---|
| 1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 07-04-2003 | 2. REPORT TYPE | 3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO) xx-xx-2002 to xx-xx-2003 | | |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Camp David Accords: A U.S. Strategic Foothold or Achilles Heel in the Middle East? Unclassified | | 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER | | |
| 6. AUTHOR(S) Crotty, Richard C. ; Author | | 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER | | |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks Carlisle, PA17013-5050 | | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER | | |
| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS , | | 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) | | |
| 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APUBLIC RELEASE | | | | |
| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES | | | | |
| 14. ABSTRACT See attached file. | | | | |
| 15. SUBJECT TERMS | | | | |
| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: a. REPORT Unclassified | | 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR) | 18. NUMBER OF PAGES 27 | 19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Rife, Dave RifeD@awc.carlisle.army.mil |
| b. ABSTRACT Unclassified | | 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER International Area Code Area Code Telephone Number DSN | | |
| | | | | Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39.18 |

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Richard C. Crotty

TITLE: The Camp David Accords: A U.S. Strategic Foothold or Achilles Heel in the Middle East?

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 07 April 2003 PAGES: 27 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The Camp David Accords Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt, sponsored by the U.S., has been extremely successful and productive for the past 23 years. The strategic significance of this treaty is enormous for the United States: It has provided an enduring peace between the Israelis and Egyptians, especially along the Sinai border. The Treaty's success can be directly linked to the U.S. strategic foothold in the peace process. The U.S provides peacekeeping forces to the Multinational Force and Observers and economic aid to both countries, which has been extremely successful. The Accords also established a Framework for Peace by promoting a dialogue concerning Palestinian statehood; however, attempts by the U.S and Israel to follow through on this Framework have been unsuccessful. Are the Accords the Achilles heel for the United States in the Middle East or a strategic foothold for U.S foreign policy in the 21st Century?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-----|
| ABSTRACT..... | III |
| PREFACE..... | VII |
| THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS: A STRATEGIC FOOTHOLD OR ACCHILES 'HEEL FOR THE UNITED STATES? | 1 |
| THE STRATEGIC FOOTHOLD FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS..... | 2 |
| THE SINAI, BRIGHT SPOT OF PEACE IN THE DESERT..... | 3 |
| THE U.S. ACHILLES HEEL IN THE MIDDLE EAST?..... | 4 |
| U.S. MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL FOOTHOLDS ARE IN JEOPARDY..... | 5 |
| POLICY SOLUTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES' ACHILLES HEEL IN THE MIDDLE EAST | 7 |
| TWENTY FIRST CENTURY STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST..... | 8 |
| IMPLEMENTING THE FRAME WORK FOR PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PALISTINE9 | |
| CONCLUSION..... | 13 |
| ENDNOTES..... | 15 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 17 |

PREFACE

I would like to thank Colonel Randy Pullen for his friendship, mentoring, and guidance during this project. His mentoring broadened my horizons about communicating through the written word. I would also like to recognize the Communicative Arts office for their exceptional advice and hard work in making this project a success. Also, I would like to thank the US Army War College Library staff for their professionalism and assistance during the course of this project.

THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS: A STRATEGIC FOOTHOLD OR ACCHILES 'HEEL FOR THE UNITED STATES?

The Camp David Accords, the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, sponsored by the U.S., has been extremely successful and productive for the past 23 years. The strategic significance of this treaty is enormous for the United States: It has provided an enduring peace between the Israelis and Egyptians along the Sinai border. The Accords gave the U.S. a strategic foothold in the Middle East peace process. The U.S provides peacekeeping forces to the Multinational Force and Observers that independently oversee and observe the workings of the Accords. The U.S. also provides economic aid to both countries. The Accords also established a Framework for Peace by promoting a dialogue concerning Palestinian statehood. Nonetheless, attempts by the U.S and Israel to follow through on this Framework have been unsuccessful. Internal debate over continued U.S. participation in the Multinational Force and Observers and the Palestinian issue has exposed an Achilles heel for the United States as it strives to promote a lasting peace in the Middle East. Even so, a way to build a lasting peace between Israel and Palestine can clearly be seen in the Sinai, Egypt.

Our nation's interest in the Middle East region began in 1948, when the nation of Israel was created and recognized as a legitimate state by the Truman Administration. Israel and her Arab neighbors then fought two regional wars in 1967 and 1973. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war was the bloodier of the two; this conflict drew the USSR and the US into a heightened nuclear alert as they assumed supporting roles as providers of conventional material and equipment, the U.S. to Israel, the Soviets to the Arab states. At the war's end Israel emerged victorious and seized the strategic Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, which gave the Israelis a large security zone along her southwestern border with Egypt. During the Carter administration peace was achieved through the Camp David Accords, ending the state of war between Israel and Egypt. The Accords also provided a document for framing a peaceful solution to the Israeli-occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip, thus a proposed solution for the creation of a Palestinian state.

Under the peace treaty, the United States guaranteed Israel the security of her southwestern Sinai border with Egypt when the land was repatriated to Egypt. The Accords originally designated the United Nations to monitor the Sinai borders; however, during the U.N. ratification process, the USSR threatened to exercise its Security Council veto of the initiative. In 1981, the Reagan Administration successfully brokered an agreement with Israel and Egypt to create an independent Multinational Force and Observer organization concept, outside UN jurisdiction, for border security. President Reagan requested legislation authorizing U.S. armed forces participation in the Multinational Forces and Observers. On 12 December 1981,

Congress passed Public Law: 97-132 "authorizing the participation of U.S. Armed Forces for the sole purpose of implementing the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel".¹ Today, as the lone superpower, the United States is still very much involved in the MFO and strategically engaged in the Middle East, a volatile region fostered by the Palestinian's ongoing quest for statehood, the war on terrorism, and the impending U.S. invasion of Iraq.

THE STRATEGIC FOOTHOLD FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS.

U.S. national strategy in the Middle East calls for active engagement to promote democracy. This strategy has been embraced by nine administrations with one over-arching goal: peace and stability in the region. Through creation of the Multinational Force and Observers, the U.S sought to enforce and monitor the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel along the Sinai border and surrounding seas. Further, the United States seeks to encourage economic development and commerce in the region by providing foreign aid to both parties. Lastly, the U.S. encourages diplomacy between both parties to settle disputes, to promote freedom, and to promote for human rights in the area. The United States employs several ways to achieve these objectives: commitment and reassurances of US military power to both countries in the area, specifically land forces located in the Sinai; economic aid, loans, and foreign aid in the form of agricultural and technological products; and finally diplomatic influence on both parties to spread democracy in the region. U.S. strategy is supported by the U.S. Congress, which specifically approved the commitment of U.S. forces, U.S. contractors and equipment, and the allocation of funds for the U.S. portion of the MFO costs-all of which remain in effect today.

Our operational concept since 1981, still in effect in 2003, is the manning of a geographical demilitarized zone. The demilitarized sector in the Sinai borders the Gulf of Aqaba, the Straits of Tiran to the east, extending to the city of Sharm-el-Sheikh to the south and Elat to then north. Within this zone, a US infantry battalion with logistical and air support rotate every six months with an original cap of 1,200 personnel. Its mission is to physically man observation points, border checkpoints, and sector control centers. U.S. civilian contractors located in Sharm-el-Sheikh operate the U.S. base camp. U.S. contractors also provide maintenance, communications, and technical support throughout the sector, as well as MFO observers who rove the sector observing and reporting actions. The MFO has successfully supported U.S. strategy within the U.S. sector. More important, the sector is flourishing, enhancing the Egyptian economy.

THE SINAI, BRIGHT SPOT OF PEACE IN THE DESERT

The Sinai, Egypt and the Multinational Force and Observers serve as a model of success for the rest of the region for the promotion of democracy and trade. The future of a peaceful and prosperous Middle East is located specifically within the U.S. sector along the Gulf of Acuba from Sharm-el-Sheik in the south to Taba in the north. Over the last two decades the government of Egypt developed the region:

Figures show that the tourism industry has been growing fast over the past decade. The number of tourist nights have increased by 128 percent from 9 million in 1983 to 25.1 million in 1996. The number of tourists have more than doubled from 1.5 million in 1983 to 3.5 million in 1996. The number of hotels has grown tremendously from 300 in 1984 to 761 in 1996, up by 154 percent, with an increase of 168 percent in the number of hotel rooms to 68 thousand in 1996. The revenue received from the tourism industry has increased fifteenfold from \$206 million in 1983 to close to \$3.1 billion in 1996. Tourism is not only a foreign exchange earner but it also has substantial impact on employment in other sectors such as transport, food processing, textiles, crafts and the small scale informal sector in manufacturing and services, which are particularly labor-intensive. Direct and indirect employment in the tourism sector is estimated at around one million of which a quarter is in the hotel industry and tourist establishments.

According to the World Bank, international tourism is projected to grow at a rate of 5 percent during the 1990s to become the largest single item in world trade by the end of the century. Egypt's current share of world tourism is just under one percent at three million visitors and could easily reach its target of seven million by the year 2000, given the buoyancy of hotel construction, especially for leisure tourism in the coastal areas. The major advantage that Egypt has over its competitors in the Mediterranean region is the far longer warm season that lasts for nine months of the year along the Red Sea. The coastlines along the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba are only responsible for one-tenth of tourists at present, but these regions are being increasingly promoted for leisure tourism. Since the early 1980s, the industry's fortunes have inspired Egyptian investors to put their funds into tourism development as never before. This is apparent in those coastal areas where winter sunshine and magnificent coral reefs are attracting growing numbers of visitors. These areas will account for the majority of the 50,000 rooms that will be added to the existing 67,000 during the next five years. Sharm El-Sheikh is one of the most appealing and successful coastal developments in Sinai. The resort now has 4,000 hotel rooms and this will treble in the next two years. At its heart is Naama Bay, between the town of Sharm El Sheikh and the international airport, which receives more than 30 European charter flights a week during the winter season. Sharm El-Sheikh is only 20 km away from one of the finest diving locations of the world - the Ras Mohammed National Park and 'coral wall' at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula.² A growing number of Egyptian holdings are linking up with their international counterparts in the hotel and tourist development business. One such partnership has been Accor Hotels S.A.E., established in 1993 as a joint stock venture between the French Accor Group and the Egyptian El Maghraby Group. This is now one of the most dynamic tourism development companies in Egypt.

Its management strongly believes that the increasing political and economic stability, coupled with tourism encouraging policies and investor confidence, will result in the development and the growth of the tourism industry in Egypt.³

The Sinai is a budding model of democracy and a potential economic powerhouse. It will provide thousands of good-paying jobs for the exploding Egyptian population in the 21st century. The catalyst for this success is U.S. presence and strategy, in the form of "boots on the ground" strengthened by diplomatic and national interests advanced 23 years ago. However, the success of the Accords has not fostered greater regional peace and stability, as its framer's hoped it would. The Sinai remains a beacon of hope- but not much more.

THE U.S. ACHILLES HEEL IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

The 1979 Camp David Accords brought peace to Egypt and Israel. It served also as a catalyst for a second peace agreement between Jordan and Israel in 1994. However, a real and substantial peace in the Middle East finally depends on the establishment of a Palestinian state within Israeli controlled territories, specifically the Gaza strip and the West Bank. In his 26 March 1979 letter to President Anwar Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin outlines the Framework for Peace in establishing a Palestinian state:

In accordance with the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" delegations may include the Palestinians. The purpose of the negotiations shall be to agree on the modalities for establishing the self-governing authority, define its powers and responsibilities.⁴

The United States and Egypt agreed to Begin's memo of understanding. The United States again sponsored this process. After the signing of the Camp David Accords, both the Israeli prime minister and the Egyptian president came under intense external and internal political pressure throughout the region to abort the plan for a Palestinian state. Egypt's Arab neighbors refused to recognize the treaty and condemned Egypt for making peace. The Israelis immediately fell out of favor with the United States after a disagreement on the timeline for ending the buildup of Israeli settlements on the West Bank. The peace process that showed so much promise for Palestine and the region fell apart by 1980.

By the mid 1980's, Palestinian uprisings within the occupied territories known as the Intifada in Arab circles, brought violence and unrest to the region, leading to failure of a peace settlement between Israel and Egypt⁵. Today, history is repeating itself: The Second Intifada is bringing unconventional violent terror attacks targeted against innocent Israeli civilians. A peace

settlement in 2003 is very unlikely, since Israel has designated this conflict their war on terror. Furthermore, a much-maligned Palestinian leadership has encouraged these attacks and has received covert funding from nation-states that support the struggle for creating the state of Palestine and the destruction of Israel. During this current conflict, the United States has strongly supported Israel, calling on the Palestinian leadership to bring a halt to the terrorism prior to initiating peace negotiations. U.S. support of Israel and the invasion of Iraq have incensed many Arabs and their leaders in the region. Arab sympathizers view U.S. policy in the Middle East as exhibiting a double standard: U.S. policy has antagonized the Arab world when it comes to the enforcement of UN resolutions toward Iraq, while ignoring Israel's refusal to comply with U.N. resolution 242 which calls for the return of territories captured by Israel in the 1967 war. The quest for a lasting Arab –Israeli peace will have to wait until the Iraqi situation is resolved- either diplomatically or forcefully.

U.S. MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL FOOTHOLDS ARE IN JEOPARDY

After the Cold War the United States found itself as the lone superpower and the only superpower with a force projection capability. Yet despite a reduced military force structure, the U.S. Army has responded to an increasing number of peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions and deployments in Operations Other Than War. After the peacekeeping failure in Somalia, and the peacekeeping deployments in the Balkans in 1995, the Clinton administration under Congressional pressure, reexamined the U.S. role and strategy in peacekeeping missions. Presidential Decision Directive 25 called for a greater “shared responsibility” of former adversaries in peacekeeping missions. The Directive called for “25% reduction in operational peacekeeping costs for such missions.”⁶ After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, the Defense Department ordered the services to review all deployed war fighting forces in order to muster support for the war on terrorism. The effects of this review were far-ranging; they were clearly spelled out in the Multinational Force and Observers, Director General's report of 2002, stating that the MFO organization has serious concerns toward future U.S. involvement:

The Bush Administration came to office publicly committed to review U.S. military deployments around the world. The review has been accelerated by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the increasing commitments and operational tempo of the U.S. military. The Department of Defense initiated a consultative process with the Treaty Parties this past spring to discuss reductions in the 865 U.S. Army personnel serving in the MFO.⁷

Currently, DOD is actively seeking for alternate courses of action in support the MFO mission. In January 2002, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, "called for the withdrawal of our forces in the Sinai. The intent is to draw down the current force of 865 plus to a force of 26 observers."⁸

Accordingly, "On 2 August 2002, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Mr. Douglas Feith, issued a briefing on the on the reconfiguration of the Multinational Force and Observers and announced that trilateral meetings are under way with the governments of Egypt and Israel."⁹

This policy review questions the validity of the requirements after 23 successful years of maintaining the peace. Nonetheless, the United States is still very much strategically committed to the region, as indicated by this joint press release after a trilateral meeting among Egypt, Israel and the United States:

At the invitation of the United States, representatives of the governments of Israel and Egypt, and with the participation of the director general of the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO), conducted trilateral consultations on the structure and composition of the MFO. The three sides agree upon the historic and vital role played by the MFO since the establishment of peace between Egypt and Israel and express appreciation for the contributions made by all participants in the MFO, especially the U.S. Army. The United States reaffirms-and Egypt and Israel acknowledge -its commitment to continued support for Egyptian-Israeli peace, and for the MFO as a force contributing to the broad objectives of enhancing and sustaining regional security and stability. All sides agree upon the need to ensure that the MFO continues to carry out its mission in the most efficient manner possible. In this regard, the sides agree to conduct further, expert-level discussions to determine how best to maintain the effectiveness of the MFO, while rationalizing the participation of United States forces. Both Egypt and Israel express their understanding of the competing requirements faced by United States forces around the world, especially in light of the war on terror.¹⁰

The U.S. is primarily concerned about the monetary, manpower and readiness costs or (in strategic terms, the resources) of providing forces for the mission. Individually, the US annual expense for supporting the MFO peacekeeping package in 2000 came to 16 million dollars. However, this cost does not reflect the total costs of having three separate US battalions in the preparation, execution, and recovery phases of the operation. Over the past five years, the U.S. Army has phased into the MFO rotations Reserve Component battalions, which has relieved some of the operation tempo (optempo) from the Active Component and thus freed these AC battalions for war fighting missions.

In 1998, Secretary of Defense William Cohen issued the Fiscal Years 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance and directed a study of Reserve Component force employment. The ensuing Reserve Components Employment Study (2005) determined that the personnel costs of dedicating an infantry battalion every year

to the MFO mission would be 32 million dollars above programmed costs to prepare, train and equip Reserve Component battalions to the required readiness levels for the mission.¹¹

Increasing monetary costs, the war on terrorism and the impending war with Iraq will prompt the Defense Department to reevaluate the relevance of supporting the MFO. Before the U.S. redesigns its force structure within the MFO and changes strategy in the Middle East; however, all courses of action should be reviewed in the context of the strategy goal of bringing a lasting peace to the region.

POLICY SOLUTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES' ACHILLES HEEL IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The recommended and immediate options for the United States' role in the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, Egypt, are in keeping with the Camp David Accords and the parameters set by the U.S. Congress. The following policy recommendations for the internal U.S. debate on the future of U.S. participation in MFO are in keeping with US foreign policy objectives. The first option is to negotiate with the Israeli and Egyptian governments for an End State to the Camp David Accords and the withdrawal of the Multinational Force and Observers from the Sinai. The second option is to withdraw the majority of U.S. ground forces from the Multinational Force and Observers, leaving a small contingent within the MFO Command Structure. Under guidelines set in the Accords, the U.S must find another country to agree to provide forces in its place in the Sinai, but before acting the President must notify the Congress of his action, and the U.S. Congress must approve the agreement.¹² The third and final option for the U.S. is to maintain its presence within the MFO and the Sinai, but withdraw the U.S. Army ground forces and logistical support. Then the MFO must redesign the force and observer concept, utilizing the latest satellite and sensor technology available to monitor the entire demilitarized zone within the Sinai. Funding for this redesign would come from Israel, Egypt, and the United States. The MFO, under this option, would become a paramilitary police and observer force relying on civilian contractors. The U.S. could provide contract technicians and logisticians within the MFO headquarters to monitor and support the operations in the field.

Strategically, all of these options still retain the United States influence in the Sinai and ensure the stability that began 23 years ago. Critics would argue that an altered MFO format would threaten a fragile peace. Other critics would declare that the time has come for Israel and Egypt to further the peace process and open their borders, as many friendly nations have done after a prolonged period of monitoring the peace.

TWENTY FIRST CENTURY STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The United States will remain committed to seeking peace in the Middle East. The question that remains is how we can achieve our over-arching goals of a democratic, prosperous, and peaceful region. The strategic model could be a Multinational Force and Observer peacekeeping organization for implementing a peaceful end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This concept that works so well between Israel and Egypt should be applied to the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The United States has strongly supported Israel in every endeavor since her declaration of independence. As the only true democracy in the region, Israel enjoys strong U.S. support in the region; however, a true and lasting peace settlement that will benefit the region depends on the implementation of UN resolution 242. In order to establish a sovereign Palestinian state; a Multinational Force and Observer organization, complete with U.S. ground forces on the Israeli-West Bank and Gaza borders will strengthen the peace process as it did in the Sinai. History confirms that when U.S. forces are involved at the tactical level our strategic goal of establishing a democracy is more likely to be realized than when we make no such commitment.¹³

The United States must press the United Nations, the Arab League, and the Western world to support this solution in order to stop the bloodshed of the Second Intifada. In a recent speech to the Conference on the Arab Countries on 10 November 2002 Anthony H. Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies declared that:

The most dangerous direct source of friction between the Arab world and the West is the Second Intifada and the collapse of the Arab-Israeli peace process. This is a tragedy in which all sides are deeply to blame. The recent governments of Israel have made many serious mistakes. So has the West and particularly the US. But, Arab leaders have made the most critical mistakes that have led to this crisis. And many go far beyond the tensions between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Every outside observer must credit King Hussein and President Mubarak with doing much to move their nations forward. There are no quick, fair, good, or easy solutions. However, the first step is to recognize that the Second Intifada is an asymmetric war based on asymmetric means, values, and goals, and not a matter of one side's "terrorism" or another side's "occupation." Both Israel and the Palestinians are locked into an asymmetric war where both sides are equally guilty and constantly escalating to nowhere without any meaningful form of conflict resolution. The time has come for both sides to deal with these realities. The Arab world needs to unite to create a true peace partner in the Palestinians and to do all it can to bring an end to the Palestinian side of the violence. The West, and particularly the US, needs to make an open ended commitment to actively pushing for a just peace for as long as it takes. Progress depends on consistent Arab, US and European efforts to create a viable Palestinian state and focusing on future needs rather than past hopes and

ambitions. The US and the West must recognize that progress means a real and unfaltering US occupation to the limits of greater Jerusalem area and limited security adjustments to the 1967 lines. The Arab world must recognize that the US will never turn its back on Israel, abandoning its firm commitment to Israel's security, or coercing Israel into a peace that it does not wish to accept.

So far, only Crown Prince Abdullah has shown real courage on the Arab side. Europe has dithered and the Bush Administration has failed to act decisively and with consistent visibility -- much less consistent muscle. Every day increases Arab frustration and resentment. Neither Israel nor the Palestinians have any meaningful way out of their present tragedy. Jordan and Egypt face a growing threat to their stability and the peace process, and another generation of young men and women will be damaged or wasted. At the same time, the Arab world must accept the fact that no one can recreate the Levant of 1948 or 1967; any more than Israeli extremists can recreate Eretz Israel. No Palestinian refugee is ever going back to his or her father or grandfather's home or orange grove in Israel. The Arab world needs to face the fact that it must absorb virtually all of the Palestinian refugees already in Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria and there will never be a meaningful right of return. Yet, no peace can work without a radical new economic future for the Palestinians already in the West Bank and Gaza. This means the West, Israel and Arab states need to give far higher priority to dealing with the human needs of today's Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, and who are refugees in Arab states.¹⁴

With a renewed emphasis on the provisions found within "Framework for Peace" in the Camp David Accords, the United States can produce a settlement between Israel and Palestine. The tool for peace could very well be the same strategic concept that has enforced a lasting peace in the Sinai.

IMPLEMENTING THE FRAME WORK FOR PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PALISTINE

In order to bring peace to the region, the United States must regain the initiative in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. We need an invigorated, impartial, and aggressive policy toward Israel and Palestine. The U.S. must have the internal political will to enforce this recommended long term policy for success in the region.

The U.S. must promote secret talks between the Israelis and a legitimate Palestinian representative to and negotiate a ceasefire. The Israelis must immediately stop new construction of all settlements within the West Bank and allow freedom of passage between the borders. During this secret peace process, the parties must jointly acknowledge the sovereignty of the state of Palestine and the right of Israel to exist.

Daniel Pipes a noted observer and foreign policy expert on the Middle East has the following view on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process:

Originally proposed by Natan Sharansky, Israel's deputy prime minister, this idea was picked up by George W. Bush, who devoted a major policy speech to the

subject in June 2002. Proclaiming that it is "untenable for Palestinians to live in squalor and occupation," the President outlined a vision whereby, as a means toward acquiring a state that would live in peace alongside Israel, the Palestinians would develop "entirely new political and economic institutions based on democracy, market economics, and action against terrorism." He specifically mentioned transparent financial institutions, independent auditing, and an independent judiciary.

The "Road Map", first adopted in September, might be thought of as the State Department's belated answer to the President's June 2002 proposal. The product of consultations by the "Quartet" (the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations), it bears a name (the "concrete, three-phase implementation road map") that suggests its incremental quality. The first phase, proposed for early this year, would have the Palestinians hold "free, fair, and credible elections" and Israel withdraw to its positions of September 28, 2000 "as the security situation improves." The second phase, to kick in later in the year, will "focus on the option of creating a Palestinian state with provisional borders based upon a new constitution." The final phase (2004-05) will see Israeli-Palestinian negotiations "aimed at a permanent-status solution"; once these are achieved, Israel would pull back from territories it won in 1967 "to secure and recognized borders."

The American government regards the dates in the road map as guidelines, whereas the other three parties prefer to consider them hard and fast. Others find the whole road-map process too slow. Thus, the Israel Policy Forum, an American advocacy group, has developed a detailed four-step "on ramp" in anticipation of the road map's inception. No less impatiently, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced a series of meetings in London to include the Quartet, the Palestinians, and officials from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. (To make an agreement easier to reach, Blair conveniently left out the Israelis.)

The road map is vague about conditions to be imposed on the Palestinians and specifically about what, if any, penalties they would pay for noncompliance. But there are some and they make up the third grouping in the constellation of new ideas who chafe at conditions altogether, preferring to proceed in the hope that an ample supply of carrots will lead to the desired result. Henry Hyde, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, has proposed a "Marshall Plan" for the Middle East that promises the Palestinians (and others) a comprehensive economic development program. The core of this idea, which has the support of Tom Lantos, the committee's ranking Democrat, is, in Hyde's words, that "people who had hope of a better life in economic terms would not resort to violence."

Martin Indyk, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel, favors a more muscular and faster device. He calls for international troops to establish a "trusteeship" over the West Bank and Gaza and thereby lay the basis for "credible, representative, accountable, and transparent institutions." Thomas Friedman, the New York Times columnist, has proposed a scheme whereby "a joint American-Palestinian security force" would replace Israeli control over the territories, followed by American troops who would stay on "indefinitely."

Finally, there is the most popular idea of all: no transfer, no wall, no change in leadership, no conditions, no road map, and no foreign troops. Rather, Israel should immediately withdraw all its forces from the territories, dismantle all the Jewish towns and outposts there, and close down whatever remains of its machinery of control. The goal is to inspire a reciprocal mood of accommodation by the Palestinians or, failing that, a de-facto separation that would benefit both sides. "Leave the Settlements, Return to Ourselves" is how the left-wing Israeli organization Peace Now promotes this notion. Variants of the same idea have been put forward by such figures as Amram Mitzna (the recent Labor candidate for prime minister), by Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah, by virtually every European government, and by the overwhelming majority of leftists, academics, journalists, and diplomats around the world, not to speak of religious and business leaders.

The forceful removal of Palestinian Arabs from Israeli-controlled territories would indeed reduce Israeli casualties, but the political price, both abroad and within Israel, would be incalculable, rendering this option more fantastical than real. The voluntary departure of Palestinians is even more unrealistic. Jordan-is-Palestine is a non-starter for many reasons, of which the single most important is that neither Jordanians nor Palestinians show the slightest readiness to go along with it. Since there is no inclination among Palestinians to accept Jordan as a substitute for Palestine, much less Amman for Jerusalem, the only conceivable outcome of such a policy, were it somehow implemented, would be to add Jordan as a base for the Palestinian conquest of Israel.¹⁵

On 14 March 2003, President Bush again outlined his "Roadmap" or strategic vision for bringing peace to the Israeli and Palestinian conflict:

We have reached a hopeful moment for progress toward the vision of Middle Eastern peace that I outlined last June. I spoke of a day when two states, Israel and Palestine, will live side by side in peace and security. I called upon all parties in the Middle East to abandon old hatreds and to meet their responsibilities for peace. The Palestinian state must be a reformed and peaceful and democratic state that abandons forever the use of terror. The government of Israel, as the terror threat is removed and security improves, must take concrete steps to support the emergence of a viable and credible Palestinian state, and to work as quickly as possible toward a final status agreement. As progress is made toward peace, settlement activity in the occupied territories must end. And the Arab states must oppose terrorism, support the emergence of a peaceful and democratic Palestine, and state clearly that they will live in peace with Israel.

This moment offers a new opportunity to meet these objectives. After its recent elections, the nation of Israel has a new government. And the Palestinian Authority has created the new position of Prime Minister. Israeli and Palestinian leaders and other governments in the region now have a chance to move forward with determination and with good faith.

To be a credible and responsible partner, the new Palestinian Prime Minister must hold a position of real authority. We expect that such a Palestinian Prime Minister will be confirmed soon. Immediately upon confirmation, the road map for

peace will be given to the Palestinians and the Israelis. This road map will set forth a sequence of steps toward the goals I set out on June 24th, 2002, goals shared by all the parties. The United States has developed this plan over the last several months in close cooperation with Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations. Once this road map is delivered, we will expect and welcome contributions from Israel and the Palestinians to this document that will advance true peace. We will urge them to discuss the road map with one another. The time has come to move beyond entrenched positions and to take concrete actions to achieve peace.

America is committed, and I am personally committed, to implementing our road map toward peace. Our efforts are guided by clear principles: We believe that all people in the Middle East -- Arab and Israeli alike -- deserve to live in dignity, under free and honest governments. We believe that people who live in freedom are more likely to reject bitterness, blind hatred and terror; and are far more likely to turn their energy toward reconciliation, reform and development.

There can be no peace for either side in the Middle East unless there is freedom for both. Reaching that destination will not be easy, but we can see the way forward. Now the parties must take that way, step by step, and America will be the active partner of every party that seeks true peace.¹⁶

Economically, the West bank and Gaza need an economic stimulus to further stability.

Anthony Cordesman states that:

"Yet, no peace can work without a radical new economic future for the Palestinians already in the West Bank and Gaza. This means the West, Israel and Arab states need to give far higher priority to dealing with the human needs of today's Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, and who are refugees in Arab states".¹⁷

After a Palestinian state has been established, the U.S., along with other friendly Arab countries must form, man, and provide equipment and resources for a Multinational Force and Observer organization to provide border security for Israel and Palestine. Here, as in the Sinai, the United States would have to commit U.S. troops on the ground in order to provide a strategic foothold to achieve the goal of a lasting peace. This coalition of multinational forces should be as diverse as it in the Sinai, impartial of regional influence, i.e. from South America and Europe. Additionally in the West Bank and Gaza, friendly Arab states and the United Nations must provide the internal security and policing expertise in order for the new Palestinian government to mature and flourish. Likewise, the United States must provide the expertise and resources for rebuilding the infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza. This will not require U.S forces; it is a job for civilian and non-governmental relief organizations with expertise in engineering. They should hire and train Palestinians for much of the actual work. Furthermore, the United States must provide assistance and expertise to the new Palestinian government in

the creation and establishment of a constitution, a legislature and executive branches of government. Information-sharing and positive media will be an important piece of the whole process. From the onset, the friendly Arab and Israeli governments must agree to a mutual public relations campaign to win the hearts and minds of both populations. This campaign should truthfully promote the peace and fearlessly indict those who would seek to undermine the peace.

CONCLUSION

Peace in the Middle East can only be achieved when both Israel and Palestine agree that armed conflict over land is futile. The 9 February 2003 Internet news reported the following article from the Christian Science Monitor News Service:

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has renewed contact with senior Palestinian leaders, an indication that the two sides might return to negotiations after months of letting guns and bombs do their talking. The meetings, involving Mr. Sharon himself, follow efforts by the Palestinian Authority (PA) to reposition itself by trying to rein in militants, establish a ceasefire, and convey an interest in peace. "Armed struggle does not benefit us," says Palestinian Interior Minister Hani al-Hassan, a key figure in the new talks. "We would like to coexist with Israel. We are ready to start a new era."¹⁸

The United States now has an excellent opportunity to support both sides within the Framework for Peace that was initiated 23 years ago. The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, which has pacified the peninsula and fostered peaceful relations between Israel and Egypt, provides a powerful model for assuring that a similar peace can be built and sustained between Israel and a newly established Palestinian nation.

WORD COUNT = 6,207

ENDNOTES

¹ S.J.RES.100Public Law: 97-132(12/29/81) Bill Summary and Status for the 97th Congress,<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?D097:SJOO1OO:@@L/TOM:/bss/d097query.html>

²[Egypt Economic Profile, 9 September 2002. http://www.sis.gov.eg/egyptinf/economy/html/eep/html/text26.htm.](http://www.sis.gov.eg/egyptinf/economy/html/eep/html/text26.htm)

³ Ibid., 2.

⁴ Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt, Attached Letters; <http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00sc0>

⁵ Daniel C. Diller and John V. Moore, The Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1994), 51.

⁶ William J. Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive 25, Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations; (Washington, D.C.: TheWhiteHouse3May1994)
<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm>

⁷ Director General's Report, 2002 Trilateral Meeting, Multinational Force and Observers, Plenary Meeting, 28 October 2002, Rome, Italy. See page 5.
<http://www.mfo.org/DG's%20report%20Trilat%202002/theyear.html>

⁸ GlobalSecurity.Org, Multinational Force and Observers, 25 April 2002; <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/mfo.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 November 2003

⁹ U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith Discusses Joint Statement On Multinational National Force and Observers <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2002/t08022002-t02feith.html>; Internet; accessed 22 September 2003, 2.

¹⁰ Director General's Report, 51.

¹¹ Office of the Secretary of Defense. Reserve Component Employment Study 2005. Washington, D.C. 22 July 1999. 11.

¹² Ronald Reagan, "Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate Reporting on the Deployment and Mission of the United States Forces in the Multinational Force and Observers." 19 March 1982.

¹³ Gordon H. Mereness, The Strategic Relevance of the Multinational Force and Observers Peacekeeping Mission in the Sinai. Strategic Research Project. (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 14 April 2000), 5.

¹⁴ Anthony Cordesman, The West and the Arab World: Partnership or "Clash of Civilizations?" Center for Strategic And International Studies, Washington, D.C. 10 November, 2002, 4.

¹⁵ Daniel Pipes, "Does Israel need a Plan,?" 2February 2003; available from www.danielpipes.org/article/1015; accessed 20 February 2003.

¹⁶ George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on the Middle East (Washington, D.C. 14March20.)<http://www.relfweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/9ca65951ee22658ec12566330004085>; Internet. Accessed 16 March 2003;

¹⁷ Anthony Cordesman, The West and the Arab World: Partnership or "Clash of Civilizations?" Center for Strategic And International Studies, Washington, D.C. 10 November 2002. 8.

¹⁸ Nicole Gauetten. "Sharon Renews PalestinianTalks":The Christian Science Monitor. 9 February2003; available from <http://www.Csmonitor.com/2003/0210/p06s02-wome.html>; Internet. Accessed 10 February 2003.1.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bush, George W., "Remarks by the President on the Middle East", 14 March 2003;available from <http://www.relfeweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/9ca65951ee22658ec12566330004085>;Internet. Accessed 16 March 2003.

Cleveland, William L. A History of the Modern Middle East, 2nd ed. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000.

Cordesman, Anthony. The West and the Arab World: Partnership or "Clash of Civilizations?" Washington, D.C.: Speech to the Conference on the Arab Countries, Issues, Answers, and Opportunities. Center for Strategic And International Studies, Washington, D.C. 10 November2002

Diller, Daniel C, and John L. Moore, Eds. The Middle East, 8th ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc, 1994.

Director General's Report, 2002 Trilateral Meeting, Multinational Force and Observers, Plenary Meeting, 28 October 2002,Rome, Italy.
<http://www.mfo.org/DG's%20report%20Trilat%202002/theyear.html>

"The Effect Of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness". 22 September 2002, p.1-7. Available from http://call.army.mil/products/spc_sdy/initrdy/peaceops.htm;

Egypt Economic Profile, 30 September 2002, p. 1-4. Available from <http://www.sis.gov.eg/egyptinf/economy/html/EEP/html/text26.htm>; Internet. Accessed 30 September 2002.

Fisher, Sydney Nettleton and William Ochsenwald. The Middle East, A History, 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Inc, 1990.

Friedman, Thomas L. From Beirut to Jerusalem. New York, Doubleday,1990.

Gauetten, Nicole. "The Christian Science Monitor: Sharon Renews Palestinian Talks" 9 February 2003. Available from <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0210/p06s02-wome.html>. Internet. Accessed 10 February 2002.

Ghali, Mona. Non-UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Middle East, Occasional Paper No. 12, . . Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, May 1993

Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars, War and Peace in the Middle East New York: Random House, 1984.

Holman, Cornelis "MFO: Peacekeeping in the Middle East". Military Review 63 (, September 1998,): 2-13.

Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), IDA Document D-1665, Prepared for Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), Case Study in Reserve Component Volunteerism: A Composite Battalion Task Force For The U.S. Army Element Of The Multinational Force And Observers Mission, Sinai, May 1995, By John R. Brinkerhoff, Stanley A. Horowitz, Project Leader

Lynch, Gregory J. Sinai Peacekeeping: How Much Longer? Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U. S. Army War College, 13 May 1998.

Mereness, Gordon H. The Strategic Relevance of the Multinational Force and Observers Peacekeeping Mission in the Sinai. Strategic Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 14 April 2000.

Multinational Force and Observers, 25 April 2002. Available from
<http://www.gobalsecurity.org/military/ops/mfo.htm>. Internet. Accessed 22 September 2002.

"The National Security Strategy of the United States of America." Washington D.C.: The White House, September 2002

"Open Skies Ready For Takeoff", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
<http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1992/jf92.smithson.html>

Parnes, Sharone. "Egypt Seeks Sinai Force Withdrawal or Cutback". Defense News 9-15 January 1995, p.10.

Peacekeeping Budget Request-Fiscal Year 2000, The Project On Peacekeeping and the United Nations, <http://www.Clw.org/org/pub/clw/un/pkbudget00.html>

Pipes, Daniel. "Does Israel Need a Plan?" 2 February 2003. Available from
<http://www.danielpipes.org/article/1015>. Internet. Accessed 20 February 2003.

Reagan, Ronald. "Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate Reporting on the Deployment and Mission of the United States Forces in the Multinational Force and Observers." 19 March 1982. Available from: <<http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches/1982/31982b.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 7 September 2002

Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations Decision Directive (PDD) 25, 3 May 1994
<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm>

S.J. RES. PublicLaw: 97-132 (12/29/81) Bill Summary and Status for the 97th Congress
<http://Thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?D097;SJ001OO:@@@L/TOM:/bss/do97query.html>

Spoehr, Thomas W. "This Shoe No Longer Fits: Changing the U.S. Commitment to the MFO", PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly, Autumn 2000, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00autumn/sopehr.htm>

U.S. Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy. VOLII, Course 2:War, National Security Policy and Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, 2002.

U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute. Guide to Strategy Text Student Issue, Carlisle Barracks, 2001.

"U.S. Department of Defense. Reserve Component Employment Study Report 2005". Washington, D.C. 22 July 1999. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/rces2005_072299.html

USD Feith Discusses Joint Statement On Multinational Force and Observers
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2002/t08022002-t02feith.html>